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I. INTRODUCTION 
We all know that Texas is ―the capital of capital punishment.‖1 
Since 2006, Texas has carried out nearly half of all executions 
nationwide.2 In 2007, more than sixty percent of the nation‘s 
executions occurred in Texas.3 Whereas momentum seems slowly to be 
turning against capital punishment elsewhere,4 Texas soldiers on.5 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Thanks to Ty Alper, 
Anne Duncan, Adam Gershowitz, Bob Schopp, and Elisabeth Semel for very helpful comments; 
to Omaid Zabih for excellent research assistance; and to James Gottry, Steven Haymore, Niels 
Jensen, and the other editors of the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW for superb editorial assistance. 
Remaining errors are mine. 
 1. Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (2007). 
 2. According to data available at the Death Penalty Information Center, Texas executed 
109 individuals from the beginning of 2006 to January 9, 2011. The other forty-nine states 
collectively executed 121 people. Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Executions 
Database, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 3. Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 
2007, at A1. 
 4. See James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the 
Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1650–65 (2006) (summarizing recent 
erosion of support for capital punishment); Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783, 866 (2010) (―The national trend is still toward a decreased use of the 
death penalty.‖). 
 5. Interestingly, while executions in Texas remain high, capital sentences in Texas have 
declined dramatically. See Semel, supra note 4, at 820 n.169 (noting that capital sentences in 
Texas have declined by sixty-five percent since 2006). 
64 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 1 (2011) 
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That, at least, is the common wisdom. In Statewide Capital 
Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death 
Penalty, Professor Adam Gershowitz argues that it is misleading ―to 
suggest that ‗the State‘ of Texas is a prolific user of capital 
punishment.‖6 As Gershowitz explains, it is not the State of Texas that 
prosecutes death penalty cases, but rather counties within the State. 
In fact, only a few of Texas‘s 254 counties seek capital punishment 
with any regularity.7 In this regard, Texas is not anomalous. Other 
states, such as Pennsylvania and California, also have wide variations 
among counties‘ imposition of the death penalty, even among 
demographically similar counties.8 Indeed, a recent study indicates 
that only ten percent of counties in the United States accounted for all 
death sentences imposed between 2004 and 2009, and that only five 
percent of counties accounted for all the death sentences between 2007 
and 2009.9 From this perspective, the nationwide disparity in death 
penalty practices is driven less by state policy and more by county 
prosecutorial practices. 
These disparities, Professor Gershowitz argues, create serious 
problems of various sorts. Counties aggressively pursuing the death 
penalty sometimes win controversial death sentences at trial. 
Gershowitz argues that such sentences are either reversed after 
rounds of expensive appeals or result in executions ―that raise serious 
questions about the culpability of the inmate.‖10 On the other side of 
the spectrum, some small, poor counties must choose between 
foregoing the death penalty for even the most heinous crimes and 
pursuing a death sentence that may be especially vulnerable to 
reversal on appeal, given the inexperience of the trial participants.11 
Professor Gershowitz offers a solution to these problems. He 
argues that rather than handling death penalty cases at the county 
level, all aspects of capital punishment cases ―should be handled at 
 
 6. Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating 
Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 308 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 308–09. 
 8. See id. at 314–15 (comparing Philadelphia County with 106 death row inmates and 
Allegheny County with ten death row inmates); ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, DEATH BY 
GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 1, 
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_by_geography/death_by_geogra
phy.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (explaining that ten counties account for nearly eighty-five 
percent of the death sentences in California since 2000). 
 9. See Death Penalty Information Center, ARBITRARINESS: 10% of Counties Account for 
All Recent Death Sentences in the U.S., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrariness-10-
counties-account-all-recent-death-sentences-us (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 10. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 309. 
 11. Id. at 310. 
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the state level by an elite group of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and 
judges whose sole responsibility is to deal with capital cases.‖12 Such a 
professionalized, statewide system, he contends, would help reduce 
costs, eliminate geographic arbitrariness, and restore confidence in 
both the overall system and individual verdicts.13 For instance, by 
cutting counties out of the equation and placing the decision to seek 
death at the state level, the plan would presumably reduce the 
number of governmental units empowered to seek capital punishment 
from well over a thousand to roughly thirty-five, thus somewhat 
mitigating the geographic arbitrariness. Gershowitz also argues that 
his proposal would help reduce the system‘s errors, because elite 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges would be less likely to 
make mistakes at trial. The reduction of such error would be 
intrinsically beneficial, and, as Gershowitz emphasizes, it may also 
help states avoid expensive appeals.14  
Gershowitz‘s article accomplishes much of what legal 
scholarship should accomplish. It challenges the common wisdom 
(that state policies drive the disparate utilization of capital 
punishment), identifies serious problems (the arbitrariness, errors, 
and costs of our current capital punishment system), and proposes a 
thought-provoking, ambitious solution (the creation of statewide 
teams of capital prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) that may 
mitigate some of those problems. For all its merits, though, 
Gershowitz‘s piece may underestimate the economic and political 
obstacles to his plan and overestimate his proposal‘s capacity to effect 
substantial improvements. The balance of this Response addresses 
these issues and the related question of whether Gershowitz‘s 
proposed reforms would be preferable to abolition.  
II. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO REFORM 
Professor Gershowitz makes a plausible case that his plan 
would mitigate some problems of our death penalty system, but a 
threshold question is whether his proposal is politically viable. One 
significant political obstacle is cost. Capital punishment is already 
extremely expensive; studies estimate that it costs several states 
millions of dollars per case—significantly more than life 
imprisonment.15 By conservative estimates, California alone spends 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 311. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER 
CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 78 (1993), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
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$137.7 million annually to maintain its capital system.16 Gershowitz‘s 
proposal may add even more to those costs. For his part, Gershowitz 
concedes that the upfront costs of his plan would be substantial but 
contends that his plan would ultimately save states money by 
reducing the number of costly appeals.17 In effect, Gershowitz is 
betting that savings on appeal will more than offset greater trial 
expenses. 
While it is impossible to predict these kinds of costs with 
certainty, there are reasons to be skeptical. With regard to trial 
expenses, some states have already experimented with statewide 
capital defender offices similar to the elite defenders in Gershowitz‘s 
proposal, and these offices have been extremely expensive.18 New 
York‘s Capital Defender Office, for instance, was so costly that the 
Governor proposed cutting its budget by seventy percent.19 Georgia 
created a similar capital defender office, only to subsequently 
withdraw funding due to legislators‘ concerns over the ―Lexus level‖ 
 
northcarolina.pdf (concluding that the extra cost of prosecuting a capital case in North Carolina 
is more than $2.16 million per execution); John Roman et al., Urban Institute, Justice Policy 
Center, The Cost of the Death Penalty in Maryland 2 (2008), available at http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/CostsDPMaryland.pdf (estimating that the average cost of a death penalty 
prosecution in Maryland is $1.9 million more than a non-capital prosecution); see generally 
James R. Acker, Be Careful What You Ask For: Lessons from New York’s Recent Experience with 
Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 683, 712–13, n.129 (2008) (discussing various studies 
concluding ―that, for reasons including lengthier pretrial investigation, heightened motions 
practice, greater involvement of experts, prolonged jury selection, bifurcated trials, lengthy 
appellate and postconviction review and frequent reversals, intensive security associated with 
death row confinement, and others, capital punishment imposed costs greatly in excess of life 
imprisonment‖); RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, MILLIONS 
MISSPENT: WHAT POLITICIANS DON‘T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (rev. 
ed. 1994), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/599 (―Death penalty cases are much 
more expensive than other criminal cases and cost much more than imprisonment for life with no 
possibility of parole.‖). 
 16. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 
146 (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter 
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION] (using ―conservative‖ estimates to find that the annual cost of capital 
punishment in California is $137.7 million as compared with a $11.5 million annual price tag for 
a system in which life imprisonment without parole is the maximum penalty). 
 17. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 354 (arguing that ―[e]lite prosecutors would exercise 
their charging discretion more carefully and handle cases more effectively, thus reducing the 
number of appeals that states would have to fund‖). 
 18. See, e.g., Yilu Zhao, Counting up the Costs of a Death-Penalty Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
2003, at B5 (explaining that New York spent at least $1 million in defense of a defendant 
accused of a capital crime and that capital defender offices like New York‘s are ―a very expensive 
proposition‖). 
 19. See Michael Cooper, Cuts Possible for Program That Handles Capital Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at B5 (―Gov. George E. Pataki‘s budget proposal would cut spending by 70 
percent on the state‘s program to represent poor defendants accused of capital crimes.‖); Richard 
Perez-Pena, The Death Penalty: When There’s No Room for Error, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at 
D3 (discussing the New York Capital Defender Office‘s $15 million budget). 
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defense of capital defendants that in one case cost $1.8 million.20 In 
light of these experiences, Gershowitz‘s proposals to employ elite 
capital defenders would probably make capital trial defense even more 
expensive and politically unpopular than it already is. Indeed, other 
states have already resisted proposals to improve the quality of capital 
representation, suggesting that Gershowitz‘s plan, however 
meritorious, may meet similar resistance.21 
Moreover, genuinely trustworthy capital trials may require 
still more money. The quality of representation for capital defendants 
hinges not only on the caliber of their lawyers but also on the 
resources available to those lawyers to conduct investigations and 
gather evidence.22 Indeed, investigation is so important that the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
recommended that to provide adequate representation in capital 
trials, the State needed not only to appoint two qualified capital 
defense attorneys but also ―an investigator and mitigation 
specialist.‖23 Such appointments, of course, would cost even more 
money and render improvements to the capital system even more 
politically challenging.24 
 
 20. Brenda Goodman, Official Quits in Georgia Public Defender Budget Dispute, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A18 (discussing the high cost of the Georgia Office of the Capital 
Defender and the Brian Nichols case). 
 21. See, e.g., Gov. George Ryan, Moratorium on Death Row Executions, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. 
L. 1, 4 (2003) (―One of my great regrets is that I could not convince the Illinois General Assembly 
to pass reforms of our capital punishment system. The reforms were met with fierce opposition in 
the state Senate . . . .‖); Death Penalty Information Center, Alabama’s Compliance with ABA 
Policies, http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assessmentproject/alabama.html (last visited Jan. 9, 
2011) (detailing Alabama‘s failure to comply with several ABA recommendations to improve 
flaws in Alabama‘s death penalty system, including many recommendations pertaining to 
adequate capital defense and prosecutorial professionalism). In fairness, some states have 
recently taken steps to improve their systems of capital representation, see, e.g., 2006-2007 
STATE BAR OF TEXAS COMMITTEE REPORTS, 70 TEX. B.J. 612, 617 (2007), but money nevertheless 
often remains a driving force in death penalty politics. See Darryl K. Brown, The Multifarious 
Politics of Capital Punishment: A Response to Smith, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 57, 64 (2008) 
(observing that Georgia has cut defense funding every year from 2005 to 2008). 
 22. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal 
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816 
(arguing that even though some public defender offices ―attract some of the most dedicated and 
conscientious young lawyers, those lawyers find it exhausting and enormously difficult to provide 
adequate representation when saddled with huge caseloads and lacking the necessary 
investigative assistance‖). 
 23. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 28; cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 
(2003) (vacating death sentence due to counsel‘s failure to present ―the available mitigating 
evidence, [which] taken as a whole, might well have influenced the jury‘s appraisal of Wiggins‘ 
moral culpability‖) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
     24. In fairness, non-capital criminal trials would also benefit from increasing defense 
attorneys‘ resources, but the dangers of inadequate defense resources are arguably most 
disturbing when the defendant‘s life is on the line.  
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Gershowitz responds to these cost concerns by contending that 
his system would save money on appeal, but it is questionable 
whether those savings would be as substantial as he suggests. 
Gershowitz argues, for instance, that more elite prosecutors would be 
―much‖ less likely to commit Brady violations, thus substantially 
reducing the number of meritorious capital appeals.25 This seems 
overstated. Even if some violations occur because inexperienced 
prosecutors, ―with the purest of motives, fail to turn over potential 
Brady material simply because they did not realize it should have 
been disclosed,‖26 it is doubtful that these good-faith mistakes account 
for all or even most Brady violations. To the contrary, ambition and 
pressure to win cases likely explain some—and possibly many—Brady 
violations.27 To this extent, Gershowitz may be over-estimating how 
differently ―elite‖ and ―non-elite‖ prosecutors will approach issues like 
exculpatory evidence and, consequently, how much money his 
proposal will save on appeal. 
Even assuming arguendo that Gershowitz‘s proposal would 
save states money in the long run, there are still political obstacles to 
rational debate. State legislators‘ perceptions of their constituents‘ 
views on capital punishment often guide their votes on the death 
penalty more than informed arguments about cost savings. Recent 
events in Nebraska help illustrate the point. After the State‘s electric 
chair was declared unconstitutional,28 the Judiciary Committee of the 
Unicameral Legislature held hearings about whether the legislature 
should adopt lethal injection as a new method of execution or, 
alternatively, abolish the death penalty altogether. Despite expert 
testimony regarding the sizable financial costs of the death penalty,29 
the State chose to preserve capital punishment and adopted lethal 
injection as its new method of execution. To most observers, this 
outcome was unsurprising. Far more surprising was the fiscal note 
 
 25. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 350 (―An elite team of prosecutors that focuses 
exclusively on handling capital cases is much more likely to prevent non-meritorious Brady 
claims.‖); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring the prosecutor to disclose 
exculpatory evidence). 
 26. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 349. 
 27. See, e.g., Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police 
Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1998) (―Even with the existence of 
clear and binding ethical rules, the pressure to suppress exculpatory evidence often overwhelms 
a prosecuting attorney.‖); infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 28. See State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008) (―death by electrocution . . . violates 
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in Neb. Const. art. I, § 9‖). 
 29. See, e.g., Neb. Unicameral Leg. Judiciary Comm. Hearings at 54 (Jan. 29, 2009) 
(testimony of Michael Radelet) (arguing that the continuation of the death penalty and adoption 
of lethal injection would require Nebraska ―to commit bundles of cash‖ to the issue). 
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attached to the lethal injection bill, estimating that the adoption of 
lethal injection and continuation of the death penalty in Nebraska 
would have ―no fiscal impact.‖30 Just a few months later, a news report 
indicated that the State had already spent more than $33,000 
adopting lethal injection.31 That price tag was limited to costs 
associated with developing a lethal injection procedure; it did not 
figure in the much higher costs associated with the death penalty 
more generally, such as the great expense of capital trials and 
appeals. Nor did the $33,000 figure include costs almost certain to 
arise from litigation challenging the new lethal injection procedure as 
cruel and unusual.32 Nor did it account for the fact that the State may 
someday change its execution procedure again, a distinct possibility 
given the nationwide shortage of thiopental, the anesthetic 
administered in Nebraska‘s and other states‘ three-drug protocol.33 
Reasonable officials, of course, can disagree about the propriety of 
capital punishment, but it is manifestly preposterous to contend that 
legislation preserving a state‘s death penalty and adopting a new 
method of execution has ―no fiscal impact.‖ Whether the fiscal note 
attached to the Nebraska bill resulted from delusion, confusion, or 
willful misrepresentation, the episode suggests that states may not 
always respond rationally to arguments like Gershowitz‘s about the 
death penalty‘s costs. 
One should not overstate the point here. Some legislators do 
try to wrestle with difficult issues. Indeed, to their credit, half of 
Nebraska state legislators voted in favor of funding a study to explore 
the costs of capital punishment.34 Other states also have begun to 
consider whether the death penalty is too expensive to retain.35 But 
 
 30. See JoAnne Young, Records Show State Has Spent More than $33,000 Preparing for 
Lethal Injection, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1 (discussing the attorney general‘s fiscal 
note attached to the lethal injection bill). 
 31. See id. 
 32. One prominent Nebraska attorney guaranteed the Judiciary Committee that he and 
other lawyers would challenge lethal injection. See Neb. Unicameral Leg. Judiciary Comm. 
Hearings at 86 (Jan. 29, 2009) (testimony of Alan Peterson) (testifying that if Nebraska adopts 
lethal injection ―[o]f course, we‘ll all litigate that and many other issues‖); see generally Eric 
Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 
259, 283–93 (2009) (discussing lethal injection litigation in various states). 
 33. See Kathy Lohr, States Delay Executions Owing to Drug Shortage, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO: 
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=129912444 (explaining that a thiopental shortage required some states to delay executions). 
 34. See JoAnne Young, Nebraska Lawmakers Turn down Death Penalty Study, LINCOLN J. 
STAR, Mar. 25, 2010, at A1. 
 35. See Semel, supra note 4, at 871 n.421 (summarizing numerous studies addressing the 
high economic cost of capital punishment); Ian Urbina, In Push to End Death Penalty, Some 
States Cite Cost-Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A1 (noting the role cost has played in 
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the death penalty remains a hot-button issue and is therefore often 
likely to inspire hot-button responses, rather than rational, thoughtful 
policy decisions. Nebraska, like many states, has had a handful of 
high-profile murders, and some state legislators may not have wanted 
to question the appropriateness of capital punishment with those 
crimes still relatively fresh in the public consciousness.36 
The point here is not that democratic outcomes are necessarily 
regrettable; numerous factors can and should play a role when a state 
decides whether to have the death penalty. That being said, politics 
and emotion can render even the most intelligent proposals politically 
unrealistic. Even though the cost issue was raised repeatedly, 
Nebraska not only adopted lethal injection with a fiscal note 
predicting ―no fiscal impact‖ but also rejected the proposed cost study 
that would have given the legislature a clearer idea of precisely how 
much capital punishment costs the State.37 In short, the Nebraska 
legislature preferred to support capital punishment without learning 
the facts about it. This episode suggests that Gershowitz may have a 
hard time persuading state legislatures to implement his plan, 
especially given that its initial costs are likely high and its long-term 
savings are debatable. 
III. THE RELATIVE MERITS OF REFORM 
In light of the political and economic obstacles to Gershowitz‘s 
proposal, it is worth addressing whether this is a political battle worth 
fighting. Gershowitz candidly concedes that a statewide death penalty 
system cannot cure all the problems with capital punishment,38 but he 
does not address whether his proposal would mitigate some of those 
serious problems substantially enough so that his improved system 
would be preferable to no system at all. American capital punishment 
is riddled with problems including, inter alia, cost, error, and racial 
inequality. Gershowitz‘s plan would address some of these concerns, 
but serious flaws would remain. It is therefore worth briefly 
considering whether his reforms would likely improve the system 
enough to merit retaining capital punishment.  
 
legislative debates about whether to repeal the death penalty in, inter alia, Maryland, Colorado, 
Kansas, and New Hampshire). 
 36. See JoAnne Young, Families of Murder Victims Live with the Memories, LINCOLN J. 
STAR, Apr. 1, 2009, at A1 (reporting on family members of Nebraska murder victims and the 
sentiment that the death penalty for such cases is ―logical, appropriate and practical‖). 
 37. See Young, supra note 34, at A1 (discussing the debate surrounding the Nebraska cost 
study). 
 38. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 344. 
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To begin (again) with money, Gershowitz argues that his plan 
would reduce financial costs associated with the death penalty by 
saving ―huge sums of money‖ currently spent on capital appeals.39 He 
contends that better trial lawyers and judges would make fewer 
mistakes, thus resulting in fewer appeals, reversals on appeal, 
retrials, and appeals from retrials.40 Nevertheless, even though fewer 
meritorious appeals (whether from the initial trial or from retrials) 
may save substantial sums, the economic costs of capital punishment 
would likely still be very significant. As discussed above, Gershowitz‘s 
plan probably increases the initial trial costs, which are already 
high.41 Moreover, even if Gershowitz were correct that his plan would 
reduce appealable errors at trial, death row inmates would probably 
still appeal numerous aspects of their convictions and sentences. 
Gershowitz contends that ―attorneys are ethically forbidden from 
raising frivolous issues on appeal,‖42 but they also have an ethical 
duty to represent their clients zealously, a duty that is heightened in 
the criminal defense and capital context.43 Given that their clients‘ 
lives are on the line, death row lawyers often appeal aggressively,44 
and even without an attorney, death row inmates can still file pro se 
appeals.45 Even assuming that these appeals would be collectively less 
numerous and less meritorious under Gershowitz‘s plan, states would 
still need to expend significant resources to deal with them.46 The 
death penalty, then, would still cost states a great deal—probably 
 
 39. Id. at 346. 
 40. See id. at 346–48. 
 41. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 351. 
 43. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, pmbl. para. 2 (2011) (―As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client‘s position.‖); id. R. 3.1[3] (stipulating that the criminal 
defense lawyer‘s obligation not to file frivolous claims is ―subordinate‖ to the criminal 
defendant‘s constitutional entitlement to the assistance of counsel); Ty Alper, The Truth About 
Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11, 66 (2009) (discussing 
lawyers‘ obligation to represent their death penalty inmate clients zealously); Monroe H. 
Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1177–79 (2003) (arguing that capital lawyers have an ethical and 
professional obligation to advocate zealously and raise all conceivable arguments); Abbe Smith, 
Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible 
Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 961 (2000) (―As a matter of professional ethics, criminal defense 
lawyers are required to thoughtfully consider all lawyering strategies that ethical rules allow 
and to employ them if they serve the client‘s interests.‖). 
 44. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 43, at 1177–79 (discussing ―the necessity to make 
‗frivolous‘ arguments in death penalty cases‖). 
 45. See Ray Sebastian Pantle, Blacker than Death Row: How Current Equal Protection 
Analysis Fails Minorities Facing Capital Punishment, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 811, 825 (2007) 
(explaining that some death row inmates proceed through the appeals process pro se). 
 46. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
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substantially more than life imprisonment without parole.47 Abolition, 
by contrast, would leave states with more money to spend on other 
criminal justice matters, such as drug programs, crime prevention 
programs, and task forces to investigate unsolved violent crimes.48 In 
light of capital punishment‘s high price tag and great uncertainty 
about whether it actually serves as a deterrent,49 the costs even of 
Gershowitz‘s improved capital punishment system may well exceed its 
benefits. 
Of course, economic cost is just one issue. Another major 
problem is error. Professor James Liebman concluded in a massive 
study that sixty-eight percent of capital cases from 1973 to 1995 
resulted in reversal.50 Given that some errors likely result from 
inexperienced trial actors,51 the adoption of Gershowitz‘s suggestions 
may improve these numbers, but substantial risk of error will likely 
remain. Even excellent lawyers and judges make mistakes, and, in all 
events, the adversarial system is far from foolproof.52 Convictions, for 
instance, sometimes rest on unreliable evidence, such as police 
 
 47. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 48. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 345. 
 49. Compare Jeffrey Fagan et al., Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share 
and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1860 (2006) (stating that 
―the marginal deterrent effect of the threat or example of execution on those cases at risk for 
such punishment is invisible‖) with Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence 
Hypothesis: Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30 E. ECON. J. 237, 237 (2004) (arguing 
that the death penalty does have a deterrent effect) and Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus 
Brutalization, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 205 (2005) (arguing that ―executions deter murder in only 
six states . . . actually increase[  ] murder in thirteen states, [and] [i]n eight states . . . ha[ve] no 
effect on the murder rate‖). 
 50. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN, A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN 
CAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT i (2002); see also CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, 
supra note 16, at 30 (noting that nationally there were 205 exonerations of defendants convicted 
of murder from 1989 and 2003, including seventy-four exonerations of defendants sentenced to 
death). 
 51. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 346 (discussing prosecutorial error in Cone v. Bell). 
Some of these reversals also may have resulted from the confused state of Eighth Amendment 
doctrine in the years after Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See, e.g., Steven Grossman, 
Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 161–62 (1996) (discussing confusion in Eighth 
Amendment doctrine).  
 52. The literature on flaws inherent in the adversarial system is vast. See, e.g., Peter J. van 
Koppen & Steven D. Penrod, Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Comparing Systems, in ADVERSARIAL 
VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
15–17 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003) (discussing criticisms of the 
adversarial system); Saad Gul, The Truth That Dare Not Speak Its Name: The Criminal Justice 
System’s Treatment of Wrongly Convicted Defendants Through the Prism of DNA Exonerations, 
42 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULL. art. 1 (2006) (―the rancor of the adversarial system means that the 
truth has taken a back seat to other, less lofty concerns‖). 
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fabrication or earnest but mistaken eyewitness testimony.53 In other 
words, the innocent can be sentenced to death even without any 
wrongdoing by the prosecutor, incompetence by the defense attorney, 
or reversible error by the judge. 
Relatedly, it is unclear that error in the capital system hinges 
so primarily on the quality of the lawyers. While better prosecutors, 
defenders, and judges may be less likely to make mistakes, they may 
also be driven by many of the same pressures currently exerted on less 
competent actors holding the same positions. Good prosecutors, for 
example, may be as or more susceptible to political pressures and 
personal ambitions than bad prosecutors.54 Of course, by removing 
prosecutors from direct elections, Gershowitz‘s proposal may insulate 
them somewhat from this political pressure, but it would still require 
the attorney general to appoint the capital prosecutors.55 State 
attorneys general presumably would weigh political concerns when 
making such appointments, and prosecutors likely would be cognizant 
of those concerns and may have political ambitions themselves.56 
Similarly, the team of capital judges would themselves come from a 
pool of current state judges, who are elected in many states and thus 
vulnerable to the acute political pressures posed by the death 
penalty.57 The proposal here might somewhat mitigate the 
 
 53. See, e.g., DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON 
AMERICA‘S DEATH ROW xv (2005) (arguing that some people are executed as a result of 
eyewitness mistakes or police lies); Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of 
Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 452 (2009) (―For decades, 
psychologists and defense attorneys have maintained that eyewitness testimony can be 
notoriously unreliable . . . .‖). 
 54. While many prosecutors are very capable, honest, law-abiding officials, many are also 
subject to well documented political pressures. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Address, The Current, 
Subtle—and Not So Subtle—Rejection of an Independent Judiciary, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 
639 (2002) (arguing that prosecutors enjoy great sentencing discretion and that they ―are subject 
to political pressures‖); Deborah L. Johnson et al., Juvenile Transfer to the Adult Criminal Court: 
The Case for Reform, 43 No. 3 CRIM. LAW BULL. art. 8 (2007) (describing ―political and public 
pressures‖ as ―inherent‖ in prosecutors‘ jobs); supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 333 (discussing how legislatures should instruct 
attorneys general to make selections of prosecutors). 
 56. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 
283, 308 & n.96 (2008) (arguing that during campaigns prosecutors and attorneys general will 
signal their ―toughness‖ to voters by signaling their support for capital punishment). 
 57. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 
760–65, 784–92 (1995) (citing examples of groups targeting sitting judges for politically 
unpopular death penalty votes); Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft 
on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 377 (2010) (arguing that state judges 
―impose the death penalty more frequently as their elections near‖); see generally Richard 
Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 181, 181 (2004) (―[T]he people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and 
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majoritarian pressures on our capital punishment system, but given 
that Gershowitz‘s primary attention is to the participants‘ experience 
and competence—and not to the political pressures within the 
system—it probably would not substantially alter those pressures.58 
Even after Gershowitz‘s improvements, then, a substantial rate of 
error may well remain.59 Needless to say, while error is disturbing in 
any criminal context, it is especially intolerable in the death penalty 
context given the finality of an execution.60 
Finally, a discussion of death penalty reform must address the 
issue of race. As Stephen Bright argues, ―[a]lmost every study of 
capital sentencing practices has found racial disparities that are 
striking, powerful, and undeniable.‖61 These disparities, many critics 
agree, result in large part from prosecutorial decisions regarding when 
to seek the death penalty.62 Any serious proposal to reform American 
capital punishment must therefore grapple with the criticism that 
race appears to be a significant factor influencing who is capitally 
charged and sentenced to death.63 
Gershowitz does address race by suggesting that it be redacted 
from state-level charging committees‘ capital files.64 This may be an 
admirable suggestion, though one wonders how effectively it would 
address the problem. The kinds of crimes that frequently become 
capital cases often generate media attention, so it is quite possible 
that a charging committee reading a race-redacted capital file would 
still know a good amount about the case, including the race of the 
 
all judges are elected in twenty-one states[;] . . . 87% of the state and local judges in the United 
States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office.‖). 
 58. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519–20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(―[T]he ‗higher authority‘ to whom present-day capital judges may be ‗too responsive‘ is a political 
climate in which judges who covet higher office—or who merely wish to remain judges—must 
constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty . . . . The danger that they will bend to 
political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same 
danger confronted by judges beholden to King George III.‖). 
 59. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 
2156 (2000) (arguing that ―trial-level officials have been free to turn their part of the [capital 
punishment] system into a machine for generating political capital on a per-death-sentence 
basis, with the inevitable byproduct of . . . error‖). 
 60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978) (―Because 
imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality, it is imperative that the standards 
by which that sentence is fixed be constitutionally beyond reproach.‖). 
 61. Stephen B. Bright, The Failure to Achieve Fairness: Race and Poverty Continue to 
Influence Who Dies, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 23, 24 (2008) [hereinafter Bright, Failure to Achieve 
Fairness]. 
 62. Id. at 24. 
 63. See id. at 26–27 (summarizing evidence of racial prejudice in prosecutorial offices in 
Houston and Philadelphia). 
 64. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 356. 
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suspects and victims. Race redaction, in other words, may not be a 
terribly effective way of removing race from the charging and 
sentencing equation. 
It is possible, of course, that the Gershowitz plan may improve 
the system enough so as indirectly to reduce racial disparities.65 
Perhaps the elite teams of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges 
would collectively be better-attuned to racial issues than current 
participants in the capital system. Perhaps also Gershowitz‘s plan 
would so substantially reduce the system‘s errors and arbitrariness 
that the death penalty‘s racial disparities would somehow be 
incidentally but significantly reduced. This is the optimistic view. The 
more pessimistic view is that the racial disparities in capital 
punishment will persist unless addressed more directly and 
thoroughly.66 In all events, given the tremendous ―influence‖ of race on 
the capital punishment system,67 this is an issue that should be 
examined more carefully if American capital punishment is in fact to 
be retained and reformed. 
Gershowitz‘s project implies that the death penalty is worth 
saving, but the problems with capital punishment in the United 
States run so deep that he might have addressed why his (possibly 
expensive) reforms are preferable to abolition. Of course, abolition is 
not currently politically realistic in some states (such as Texas), and 
the reforms Gershowitz proposes may result in some improvements 
wherever instituted. Unfortunately, though, major reform of capital 
punishment may be less politically realistic in states where the death 
penalty remains politically popular. In other words, a state like Texas 
is unlikely either to abolish the death penalty or to adopt Gershowitz‘s 
plan anytime soon. As for states where the death penalty is on shakier 
political footing, Gershowitz might have addressed whether abolition 
may be preferable—and possibly even more politically attainable—
than substantial reform. Given that support for the death penalty 
appears to be eroding,68 it seems all the more important to weigh 
 
 65. As a side note, Gershowitz‘s proposal to create statewide capital punishment teams is in 
tension with Professor William Stuntz‘s fascinating article contending that the racial inequities 
in our criminal justice system stem largely from a lack of local control. See generally William J. 
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (2008). 
 66. See Kenneth Williams, The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1177, 
1226 (2002) (arguing that proposed death penalty reforms naively and incorrectly assume that 
―once the death penalty system has been reformed, race will no longer be an issue‖). 
 67. See, e.g., Bright, Failure to Achieve Fairness, supra note 61, at 24–32. 
 68. See Semel, supra note 4, at 819 (noting that in the past few years ―[p]opular support for 
capital punishment [has] declined‖ and that during this time span there have been ―fewer capital 
prosecutions, fewer death sentences, fewer executions, growth in legislative activity to abolish 
the death penalty, and additional exonerations of death row inmates‖). 
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potential reforms not just against the status quo but also against 
abolition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Reasonable people can disagree about the morality of the death 
penalty, but, as a policy matter, American capital punishment is 
deeply flawed. Professor Gershowitz‘s proposal may improve the 
system, but, given the depth of the flaws, the resulting system would 
likely remain very problematic. To his credit, Gershowitz does not 
contend that his plan would cure all of capital punishment‘s problems, 
but he may underestimate the economic costs of his plan, the political 
obstacles to his plan, and the depth of the problems that likely would 
still remain. States might be wise, then, to use his recommendations 
to spur debate about whether they would be better off reforming the 
death penalty or, alternatively, abandoning the system altogether. 
 
